UNITY

FREEDOM, FELLOWSHIP AND CHARACTER IN RELIGION

The Church Monopoly on Its Divided Dead - - - - - - - - *John Malick*

Arguing About Freedom - *Archie J. Bahm*

A Parson's Observation on Strikes - - - - - - - - *Ernest Caldecott*

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The Field

"The world is my country, to do good is my Religion."

Window on Washington

Quietly and without fanfare some Illinois youngsters have started a rather wonderful project called the Children's Crusade. The Crusade is aiding the most pitiful of all war victims, some 95,000 boys and girls under fourteen who are lodged in the displaced persons camps of Germany. At least 40 nationalities are represented, with large numbers from the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. Perhaps because I saw some of these children last summer, I have been particularly interested in this organization.

A large portion of the displaced children are orphans, and carry seered into their memories the sight of the torture and murder of their parents. Many have also endured the bestialities of the horror camps. Others were torn from their homes, branded with identifying numbers, and rented out as farm or household help. All of them are underweight and a majority suffer from rickets, tuberculosis, or other diseases which stem from malnutrition. Large numbers have no shoes or warm clothes and so have been kept indoors all winter, although their shelters were also cold. Few of them can recall any of the joy or care which should be the birthright of all youngsters.

UNRRA is doing what it can for these tragic waifs, but supplies are spread too thin. It has been a blessing when other countries have held out a helping hand. Although exhausted by six years of war and living on meager rations, England has shared what it has with a thousand youngsters to whom it has been playing host since fall. Sweden and Switzerland have also welcomed some thousand of the boys and girls in greatest need. In America we have left it to the children to take the first step in such kindliness.

It began very simply last summer at a camp conducted by a Chicagoan, Miss Mabel Katherine Pearse. One night around the campfire she read a letter from her sister, child welfare specialist with UNRRA. The American children at once decided to do something. They did. They raised $200 for Christmas gifts which, with a special permit I was able to secure, were sent abroad with personal greeting cards. On Christmas Eve they built a bridge of friendship in a beautiful ceremony. Of all the Christmas ceremonies around the world, none could have expressed more poignantly the spirit of Christ. Far across the seas and across differences of races, many languages, and religions the children joined together in singing carols.

In recent weeks this movement has grown. Every time the story is told the project snowballs larger and a flood of gifts pour in—money, food, clothes and toys. Church groups, schools, and campfire girls are raising money, writing letters, and sending gifts. A few adults

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"He Hath Made of One All Nations of Men"

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EXPANDING PATRIOTISM

The problem of expanding national patriotism into world patriotism is central to the task of building a world order. But this is not a problem that can be solved by a frontal attack on national patriotism. Loyalty to home and fireside is too basic to be given up quickly. Indeed, it should not be given up at any time. The way to develop world patriotism is to bring people to realize that the only ultimate protection of national good is in the establishment of a world order, and that the only sure way to develop national good is within the framework of a world structure. With the coming of the Atomic Age the fact of the interdependence of the nations and of the interrelation of the interests of all peoples should be plain to all. A major war between powers possessing atomic bombs would destroy their cities and their industrial potentials in a matter of hours. And any nation not having access to atomic energy in time of peace would be industrially impotent and a drag on the rest of the world. By now it should be evident that no nation can long possess any atomic secrets. Science cannot be limited to national boundaries. Nuclear energy can and will become the possession of mankind. Any nation or people that wants the blessings of peace and the possession of material goods must become zealous for similar rights for all nations and peoples. One world is not merely a slogan; it is a fact. Just as loyalty to any state of our union requires loyalty to the United States of America, so in the new age will loyalty to any nation require loyalty to a united order of the world. Local patriotism is important, but it is not enough.

Curtis W. Reese.

The Church Monopoly on Its Divided Dead

JOHN MALICK

The church has its martyr role, each recalled on an anniversary day, with one pre-eminent martyr who is honored by the most elaborate observance of the church year. Something more, and different, is claimed for the death of the chief among the martyr host. All others turned out to be just men who died for truth as they saw it and their dying had its effect in calling attention to that truth. But for one martyr, more was claimed than for all the others who just died and were never heard of again except in history's way of keeping alive what is done by those before. This one martyr has the additional claim made for him that his death itself, just being killed, accomplished something for the whole human race. This never was claimed for Socrates, the chief of the Greek martyrs. The account of how he faced up to death did affect profoundly the world that came after but nothing of benefit was claimed for Athens or for the race by the death itself. The distinction of the chief of church martyrs goes still farther. He is heard from again as a still living person after he dies. This claim is not made for other martyrs that they were around with their friends after death. This interpretation was about a Jewish man but never was accepted by the Jews themselves, nor was such distinction ever claimed for their greatest men.

Concern about the dead is universal. Everyone has dead in whom he has special interest and knows that shortly he will be in like state. The dealing of the race with its dead is generally more creditable than its dealing with the living. Among us now the dead are thought of as having little or no part with the living and no effect upon them. In other parts of the world the dead are still a controlling influence. The first obligation of the living is what can be done for their comfort. Such provision for the dead is not wholly disinterested. It increases the likelihood of the benefit they are thought able to confer on the living and minimizes the harm they can do. This did not carry over to Western religion to which the dead are only a gradually fading memory rather than a still potent force. In Western thought only one person, after death, is represented as still an influence for or against the living. In Oriental religions this is believed about all the dead.

It is difficult to discover any great concern today about any theory of the dead. Certainly there is little leverage from the interpretation of death in general or one's own death in particular. In the whole story of our kind this is a new situation and exceptional. The rule has been that those who were believed about death exercised control. The end of life is not a contemporary concern. What concerns people most they talk about. One may associate with those of different theological persuasions and with those of no theological interests, without hearing death mentioned. The controls we have through the interpretation of death have been here a long time. If they were not here they could not arise in the modern atmosphere.

The monopoly of the churches on all matters pertaining to death is about complete in Western religion. There is no way of moving legally against the monopoly. At funeral services the conclusions may seem cruel enough about the prospects of the particular person for whom the rite is held. One may wonder if the pronouncement of the officiating churchman is all that can be said; whether there is not something more quite as likely and certainly more comfortable for the living left to carry on. The wonder about it is increased when the officiating churchman thinks the prospects not very good for the particular dead being memorialized and consigned to his proper place in the long scheme of things. Many never hear any interpretation of death except at the funeral services they attend; do not know in fact that there is any other appraisal of the situation except that given by churchmen.

As one goes into the historical background, it becomes clear how this came about. Naturally, monopolies are not given up voluntarily. Monopoly means advantage, closed against competition, and the history of advantage is that it does not of itself give up its privilege. In commerce it goes on as long as people put up with it or until governments in their name move against it. By the very nature of the democratic state, with full protection to all religious interpretations, there is no authority to move against this monopoly of the interpretation of death, whatever its misrepresentation of fact and whatever its social effects. This claim of complete jurisdiction over death comes down unchanged from the past. There has been some effort to carry over to the general mind what others besides churchmen have come to know in their vocations and experience. One man interested in the subject left a fund to make public the findings in different fields. Lectures are given at stated times in Harvard University and published. If anyone is likely to know about death it certainly is the physician. All that can be known and checked about it is known by scientists. Each is asked to contribute what has come in his special field of research. Philosophers and those dealing with psychic phenomena take their turn. Churchmen, too, are represented, giving the usual things they distribute in their churches and at funeral services. In any serious consideration of the end of life a churchman is only one among many witnesses. For people generally the churchman is the only witness. He does practically all the speaking on the subject ever heard outside of academic circles. It is known in advance just what churchmen will say on the subject and where they got it.

It seems that at first all the vocations they had did their friendly offices for the dead, using such knowledge as they thought they had. The lines dividing the professions were not clearly drawn at first. Generally people have been very eager for whatever help they thought available for their dead. By some strange evolution of affairs all that pertains to the dead came under the jurisdiction of one profession and one institution. What pertained to the living was divided among a number of professions and institutions. This situation goes back to the earliest human record and back even farther than that before the written story begins. It seems that people always have gone in their extremity about death to the authorized representatives of religion. Churchmen and those who later became physicians originally were the same profession, kind of medicine man and priest. Herbert Spencer was asked to decide which vocation is the older, the clergyman or the doctor. Spencer thought they both stemmed directly

from those who were specialists in dealing with devils. When each profession separated into its special line, the physician kept all that pertains to staying alive here. Failing this, when death came, all that was thought to be effective to do came to be the exclusive function of churchmen. Elaborate theories about death were built up, this being a fertile field for speculation. There were no disturbing facts to keep such speculation on the ground. These theories went into the place of death in the whole creative scheme, how it came to be here at all; what gives it its grip, and what can be done about it. It was a natural development at the time for religionists to set the style of thinking about death. They were the first learned men in any kind of knowledge, the first writers and readers. Their facts and theories gained currency. The race exercised its mind first on these unknown and unknowable matters.

Later, a long time later, the physician group became the distributors of all that the scientists found out about life, its beginning, end, and all between. This is all that is known about death to date. If no new light was shed upon the subject of life's end, much that was dark, and only dark, was eliminated as having no basis of fact. These two groups have gone along together, the physician distributing the new knowledge and the religionist carrying along the thought of a much earlier time. Churchmen continue to say just what they have said over a long period when nothing new was added and nothing taken away. To keep life in people, and keep death away, the physician may use what is not a month out of the laboratory, some new miracle drug, some new technique of surgery. When death comes, the physician witnesses the changed condition and retires completely from the case. The oldest, the most slowly changing profession takes over. The physician gives up the case without offering even an opinion on the condition of the patient from that time on. One may be treated with the last minute discoveries while life is still in him, but once dead is taken over by another vocation that has not taken on a new thought about death in 2,500 years. The interpretation of death distributed by churchmen comes from an authority that has not admitted new evidence since 300 A.D. One could not imagine himself in the same world going from a well-equipped hospital to a funeral service. One in fact is not in the same world. In one case he is in a new world with practically no trace left of the old; in the other he is in an old world with practically no trace of the new.

Many of the social forms pertaining to death are tied in with churchmen, they being the authority on the conventions about death. This older knowledge distributed by churchmen has considerable in it that is disagreeable, much that is tragic, some that is cruel. This situation has been here so long, has become so socially and ecclesiastically taken for granted that the most shocking things can be said, are said, in public about death in general and about one particular dead person with practically no protest from any source. There is no organized protest. We have report of quite unsubstantiated things said at funerals about the destiny of an individual who perhaps in life did not conform to the special mythology of the speaker. Unfortunately, a considerable part of the population still take churchmen seriously as authority, and the only authority, on this subject. There is no vocation nor institution among us distributing what is really known about death, and that only and no more. Whatever this new story about death may lack in supporting evidence for confidence and cheerfulness, at least there is nothing in it that is disagreeable. That in itself is great gain. At least it is clear of the imaginary fears which make most of the grief churchmen capitalize and try to assuage. Unfortunately this knowledge of the clergy is represented as absolute, 100 per cent true, in a world in which all other knowledge has become relative. By the most conservative estimate, based upon all that is known about death, it is much nearer 100 per cent untrue. We hardly ever hear anything said about death by churchmen that seems true with even a small degree of probability. Where should we be in our affairs about life and health if we drew our knowledge from as far back as churchmen draw their knowledge about death?

Somebody back some place, some one person on a particular day, put out the venture first that there is some connection between death and sin. Whoever did it, whatever his motive, it proved to be a good day's work. This speculation connecting the two was to have long range social results on the liability side. As far as is known up to this time there is not the remotest connection between death and sin. Death was established for all life a billion years or so before the planet had a being upon it who either could sin or frame a word for it. That is, all that pertains to death in the whole scheme of things was worked out and finished long before man came upon the scene. Man did not affect it in any way, for he was not here. It is beyond the bounds of the most extravagant imagination even to suggest that the worst that man can do, at his worst, ever affected in the least the established lines of life and the universe. We do not happen to know who first suggested this death-sin connection. All that we can say about it is that it was not on supporting evidence then and never has been since.

Churchmen devised, took over, and operated all the ecclesiastical machinery for dealing with sin. They defined it and apportioned the penalties. With death as the penalty for sin, churchmen gained a permanent leverage over all who believed them. This gave the basis for dividing the dead into the privileged and the underprivileged, and that has been one of the most effective controls ever devised by man. It has held its own up to the present time of democratic theory and practice which repudiates any permanent division of the living into privileged and underprivileged.

Here is the weight of great names, the authority of custom, the proprieties, and revelation. Some institutions still taking the name church are on the new basis of fact and reach widely different conclusions about man's chances in the universe. Such churches make no claim whatever to knowledge not generally available. On this, as on other subjects, they take the masters of those who know. Where the specialists are uncertain such churches reserve judgment. What is given such churches to do is to publish whatever can be known. There is nothing known so far about the end of life that gives any basis whatever for apprehension. The major fears have come from the major errors, and these now are known. Outside of revelation there are no disagreeable or disheartening facts about life's beginning or end. It would be an expiatory work for churches to publicize that their fears about death have proved groundless.

It helps clarify the situation to see man's life under

two controls: one his own, the other not his own. With one of these controls he has nothing to do. Over it he has no jurisdiction. Man takes rain, wind and all weather, the warm and the cold. About these he is sorry or glad. What one thinks about all that is under another control depends upon his general confidence in the Over-All Management. The presumption is that it is all right to make a world that way, but, right or not, it is this way. It has to be accepted and it cannot be rejected. In like manner it is accepted that life has a beginning and an end. Presumably, that is the best way to make a world.

Arguing About Freedom

ARCHIE J. BAHM

We seem to be able to choose freely. The experience of free choice is immediate, direct, and available to everybody. The appeal of certain scientists to indirect evidence in proof of complete determinism can never destroy the direct evidence obvious in the experience of everyone.

Belief in freedom of choice is universal. Both historically and at present, all people believe in the possibility of freedom of choice. Those theorists who claim that they are not free, but determined, nevertheless act as if they thought they were free; thus their actions contradict their theories, and thus they really believe that they are free to choose.

Belief in freedom of choice is presupposed by the science of ethics. Since right and wrong behavior presupposes the possibility of choosing between right and wrong, there could be no right or wrong behavior if there is no freedom of choice. Furthermore, responsibility involves freedom of choice, for if one is not free to guide the course of his actions, or if one's actions are determined by causes over which he has no control, how can he be held responsible?

Belief in freedom of choice is presupposed by law. Most laws are so written and so interpreted as to presuppose the power of choice. Assessment of penalties as punishment for law violations presupposes that the violator chose to violate. Completely accidental death is not punishable, whereas murder, i.e., intentional or freely chosen death, is punishable. If men were not free to choose, there would be no need for law, for people would do what they had to do anyway, regardless of the law.

Belief in freedom of choice is presupposed by democracy. The United States has been acclaimed as a "land of the free" because men are free from certain types of tyranny and free to decide by ballot the course of their own collective destiny. But if there is no real freedom of choice, then the freedom involved in democratic systems is a mere fiction, and the achievement of democracy meant merely the exchanging of one set of determiners for another. If there is no freedom of choice, then there can be no democracy.

Belief in freedom of choice is presupposed by some religions. The call to salvation, "Believe and be saved," assumes that such believing is voluntary, not compulsory. Otherwise, there would be no justice in receiving rewards for doing what one is compelled to do, while others receive punishments for doing what they are compelled to do. "Salvation by faith" involves "freedom of will."

Regret and pride seem to presuppose belief in freedom of choice. For the fact that we regret seems to indicate that we believe that we might have done otherwise. But if we are not free, that is, if we could not have done otherwise, why should we ever regret our actions? Likewise, we take pride in our successes and believe they are due to our own wise choices. But if there is no freedom of choice, then we cannot have chosen wisely, but of necessity, and thus can have no reason to take pride in our wisdom.

Evidence for the possibility of freedom of choice comes from the experiments of certain scientists. Heisenberg has concluded that there are some undetermined factors in the behavior of particles at sub-atomic levels. He has not only formulated a "principle of indeterminacy" but has measured some of the limits within which determination seems impossible. Now if there is some undetermined behavior at sub-atomic levels, why may there not also be undetermined behavior at the human level?

Belief in freedom of choice may be based upon the pragmatic appeal. If a belief works successfully, is useful in making adjustments, brings good results, then it is true. The belief in freedom of choice does work successfully, is useful in making adjustments, does bring good results. Therefore the belief in freedom of choice is true. The more successfully this belief works, the more true it is.

Even though critics may rebut the foregoing arguments for belief in freedom of choice, there is one argument — a "moral argument"— for belief in freedom of choice which they cannot successfully rebut. If we are happier believing that we are free, then we ought to believe that we are free — no matter whether we can prove the truth of our belief or not. For, if believing that we are not free makes us indifferent, submissive, irresponsible, sullen, unhappy, then we ought not to believe that we are not free. If we have no pride, no initiative, no will power, no ambition, no interest in making life better, because we feel that we are unfree, then we ought to believe that we are free. If the doctrine of complete determinism makes us feel that we are helpless victims of fate, we ought to seek to destroy it. This one ground alone, namely, that we are happier believing that we are sometimes free to choose, is itself sufficient reason for believing that we are sometimes free to choose.

Arguments against belief in freedom of choice may be treated in the same order as the arguments for belief in freedom of choice and as rebuttals to these arguments. It should be kept in mind that the debate is not between those who maintain that one is completely free to choose and those who maintain that one is completely determined. Rather it is a debate between those who maintain that one is sometimes (even if rarely) free to choose and those who maintain that one is completely determined.

The appearance of freedom of choice is an illusion. Really, nothing happens without a cause. So, if one chooses one rather than another of two alternatives, something in his makeup caused him to decide one way rather than another. Granted that there may be no outside compulsion and that one is aware of no inside compulsion. Yet, nevertheless, something within him

causes him to choose the way he chooses, even though it may seem to him that he chooses freely and that his choice is completely uncaused. The illusion of freedom is no more proof of real (i.e., uncaused) freedom than any other illusion is proof of the reality of whatever it is an illusion of.

The universality of an illusion is no proof of its truth. Furthermore, the claim to universality is open to question. No poll of opinion on this question has ever been taken. Furthermore, the fact that there are determinists is proof of the lack of universality. If many had not raised questions about freedom of choice, why should we, and countless others before us, have had the problem presented to us for consideration? If it is claimed that determinists still act as if they were free and that their actions belie their statements, determinists will reply that they may, and do, act as if they were unaware of the causes of their action, but they do not, because they cannot, act without being caused to act the way they do.

While there is a sense in which belief in freedom of choice is presupposed by the science of ethics, nevertheless belief in indeterminism is not essential and, certainly, belief in determinism is essential to ethics. For "freedom" means "freedom to determine." To be free to choose between alternatives means to be free to determine which of the alternatives shall follow. If, by choosing, one could not determine or cause a particular course of action to result, what would be the value of choosing? Right and wrong may involve the possibility of choosing, but they do not, because they cannot, free acts from being determined, and they do require that chosen acts determine further consequences. Furthermore, responsibility presupposes determinism. For if one's supposed choice did not determine his course of action, how could he be held responsible for it?

While belief in freedom may be presupposed in the minds of many who make and interpret laws, nevertheless so also is determinism. For the punishment imposed must, if it is to be effective, determine the subsequent behavior of the person punished. If the punishment has no determining effect, that is, if it does not cause the future choices of the culprit to conform to the law, of what use is the punishment and of what use is the law? Laws are intended to be determiners of conduct. Penalties are calculated to cause persons to choose (freely, if so it seems to them) one course of action rather than another. Furthermore, criminologists today decry those interpretations of law violation which picture the criminal as a wilful malintent against whom society justly seeks revenge. Rather they attempt to evaluate the significance of each of a multitude of causes influencing an individual's behavior and recommend treatment calculated to remove those causes tending to promote criminal behavior and to provide causes tending to prevent repetition of the criminal acts by him and by others. Even though most of our laws are written under the common, illusory assumption that men are, in a measure, undetermined in their choices, this unfortunate fact should not be permitted to becloud the more fundamental fact that criminals, like the rest of us, are completely products of the causes which determine them.

Democracy does presuppose some measure of freedom — but not freedom in the sense of indeterminism. Democracy means freedom from oppression by other political groups. But it does not mean freedom from one's causes. Determinists are democrats, too. They say that democratic forms of government will be chosen by those whose experiences have taught them that it is better than other forms. Thus there are definite sets of causes which determine whether or not one will choose to be a democrat. In a "land of the free," people may be freed from some undesirable causes, but they can never escape being completely caused.

While some religious doctrines claim to presuppose freedom of choice, others — predestinarians, for example — utterly deny all except the appearance of freedom of choice. Man is fated, they say, to do the will of God exactly as he willed it from the beginning. Furthermore, many of those who call upon men to "believe" rejoice when they *cause* men to accept the faith. Also, some, by assuming both that God is the omnipotent, original, eternal, and omnipresent cause of all and that men are completely uncaused in their choosing to believe, involve themselves in inconsistencies which have never been straightened out even to their own satisfaction. In addition, this religious doctrine of freedom to believe seems to involve the supposition that one uncaused moment of choice can determine one's status so eternally that nothing can ever change it. Determinists, on the other hand, claim that the hope for perpetuity presupposes a system in which there are no breaks, no indeterminism, no chaotic whims of chance, no uncaused choices.

Regret and pride seem to presuppose freedom of choice only when one is conscious of having made choices which he regrets or choices in which he takes pride. For the most part, we regret not having had what we wanted, regardless of whether it was possible for us to have had any choice in the matter. In fact we often regret not having had a chance to choose. We can be proud of whatever may happen to be our good fortune, regardless of whether it is a result of wisdom, of foolishness, or of mere happenstance. In any case, pride and regret are consequences. If consequences of choices, then consequences of caused choices. If it is good to be proud, then let awareness of this fact cause us to seek to act in such ways as will cause us to be proud.

Heisenberg's "principle of indeterminacy" has been condemned as being really a "principle of uncertainty." The term "indeterminacy" is ambiguous — meaning both "undetermined or uncaused" and "uncertain or unknown." If Heisenberg has elevated an area of ignorance into a physical and metaphysical principle, he has indeed fooled a lot of people. But if he has discovered a realm of being in which some causes have no effects and some effects have no causes, he has indeed done great damage to the determinist's hypothesis. Determinists, who respect the accuracy of Heisenberg's measurements and calculations, still suspect that limitations inherent in his methods of measurement are responsible for his inability to discover connections between cause and effect which must surely be there. While causes need not always have the effects which we, in our present stage of understanding, expect them to have, nevertheless, say determinists, they must have effects. Heisenberg's conclusions are still highly controversial.

On the other hand, universal determinism is (except perhaps for Heisenbergians) universally assumed in the physical sciences. Insofar as these sciences work successfully, they yield evidence in support of the doctrine. The miracles of modern science, engineering,

industry, etc., are all based upon the assumption that nothing happens without a cause. Also another basic scientific principle is violated by indeterminism. The principle of the conservation of energy is sometimes stated as the principle that no energy can be created and no energy can be destroyed. But, if indeterminists are correct, then freedom of choice involves the possibility of spontaneous creation. Insofar as one's choice is uncaused, something is created spontaneously. If this choice then causes effects, physical effects, then new energy is produced, and the principle of the conservation of energy is violated. Scientists so universally accept determinism that to appeal to doubtful Heisenbergian exceptions is to reveal the weakness of the case for indeterminism.

The pragmatic appeal works just as well for determinists as it does for indeterminists. In fact, it works better. Except for those who have faith in the illusions involved in trusting their immediate experience, the real weight of practical evidence is behind determinism. Not only the above-mentioned results of scientists and engineers, but the everyday attitudes of most of us are saturated with beliefs about causes and effects. We appeal to indeterminism only when our understanding runs out. As soon as we learn how a thing works, what causes produce what effects, we abandon our former faith in mystical spontaneity. For pragmatists who are realists, determinism works better.

The moral argument that "if belief in freedom of choice makes us live more happily, then we ought to believe it" is, indeed, irrefutable — as a moral argument. However, equally irrefutable is the argument that "if belief in complete determinism makes us live more happily, then we ought to believe it." The final test of moral obligation to believe rests ultimately with the results. While some of those who believe that freedom of choice is essential to happiness assert that indifference, irresponsibility, loss of ambition, etc., would result if they gave up their belief in freedom of choice, nevertheless most of those who claim to believe in complete determinism still retain their interest in living and striving, still bear their responsibilities and seek to increase them, still aspire to higher goals. The evils which indeterminists fear would follow upon giving up their belief have not in fact followed for most of those who have become determinists. Determinists say that happiness is more likely to result from believing the facts about determinism than from relying upon the illusions of indeterminism. If the moral argument means that one ought to believe that belief which will make him happier in the long run, then one ought to believe in universal determinism.

The foregoing arguments for belief in freedom and arguments for belief in determinism leave unsettled the question of whether one's choice can at the same time both be free and be completely determined. Those who argue for freedom of choice appealed to indeterminism only because determinists seemed to force them to do so. For the most part, those who defend the possibility of some freedom of choice have not been concerned about whether or not their choices are internally determined. They have been concerned so much about external restrictions and restraints that the determinist's attack, by way of appealing to internal determinants, left them a bit baffled and unprepared to reply. Being attacked, they sought support. Since indeterminism is a natural opposite to determinism, they sought such support as it offers. But, as this refuge was whittled away bit by bit, they came to feel fearfully unprotected, yet nevertheless convinced that freedom of choice is somehow genuinely real. But, also, they come to feel encouraged by the way that arguments of determinists are directed, not at freedom of choice, but at indeterminism. Perhaps there is a difference. Perhaps indeterminism is not essential to freedom of choice. Perhaps freedom of choice and determinism can be reconciled.

Debates of this sort, if they be carried on by reasonable men, usually end in victory for both. Determinists, in attacking freedom of choice, insisted that one's choices are determined not only by external causes, but also by internal causes. Internal determinants are determinants just as much as external determinants. This insistence involves an admission. If freedom means merely that one is not always determined by outside forces, then of course there is freedom. If "to be free" means "to be able to do what one wants to do," without considering the fact that what one wants to do has been caused, then of course there is freedom. If freedom is a name for one kind of determinism, namely self-determinism, then of course there is freedom. But such freedom is not freedom from determinism. Thus does the determinist claim victory. Victory is claimed by believers in freedom also. The determinist admission, that men can sometimes do what they want to do, is all that is required. All that we were arguing for, in the first place, they say, was that it is sometimes possible for men to choose freely between alternatives.

Greatness at Command

At any minute that one will stop to think of great things, he becomes great. There is a different rhythm to his blood and a new vibration in his brain. To the most skeptical, the rankest materialist, this applies, as well as to the poet, the dreamer, the devotee, the mystic.

This is knowledge to be arrived at by experiment and experience. The materials are one's own personal feelings and qualities, the laboratory the place at which he happens to be. The method is to be quiet, relax, and think great thoughts. Or to study and work enthusiastically, expectantly in the atmosphere of high aspiration.

Let one "stay" his mind on God, think of beauty that races with its paint brushes across the spring hills, the autumn forests, and the winter snows. Think of the grandeur with which men and women have met the burdens and dangers of life. Think of the universal wonder of the presence of law and consistent action in every atom in the universe, the mysterious wisdom of all cells and organisms. Think of greatness in men, success as a stirring fact, God as here, in action, carrying on to the heights of a glorious destiny.

On any of a million other particular manifestations of God he may dwell, or any noble quality of spirit. Greatness will sing through his nerves, and tune the soul of him to its manifestation. Littleness flees the presence of great thoughts, as darkness disappears in the light. Everyone is great as long—and only as long —as he gives his mind to great thoughts.

SHELDON SHEPARD.

A Parson's Observation on Strikes

ERNEST CALDECOTT

For many years the strike has been recognized as a lawful means whereby working people may effectively register a protest against some phase of their condition of employment.

Let me say, at once, I am opposed to "striking." Nor am I basically concerned as to whether an act is legal or illegal. The real question is whether it is right or wrong in the sense of being helpful or harmful to the common good.

For the moment, however, we must accept the right to strike as legally defensible. Through history, workers have had to fight for decent wages, better working conditions, and shorter hours. Very rarely, since the beginning of the industrial era, have employers of large numbers of persons—on their own account—improved the lot of their workers. Indeed, it is only within the lifetime of many of us that the person known as the "working man," and now, also, the "working woman," has had reasonable conditions of labor. This period happens to coincide with the existence of organized labor. In this connection, it is significant to note that while everyone now agrees that labor ought to have the right to organize, relatively few of those outside the rank and file agree that organized labor has always conducted its business properly. Yet historical evidence on the coincidence of organized labor and improved conditions is both enormous and convincing.

It is but twenty-five years ago that a President of the United States called in the chairman of the board of directors of one of the largest industrial corporations and urged him to shorten the working hours of his employees—*and* without reducing their wages. It was largely reported at the time that the employer informed the President that his corporation would acquiesce, but only because it was the President making the request.

This employer is said to have declared that the working man would not know what to do with the extra hours at his disposal, and would soon be back asking for additional employment. Up to now this has not happened in his corporation or any other known to me. Here again it will be noted that improvement came only as the result of pressure.

The fact should be stated that, of course, the worker does not own his job in the sense in which he owns the clothes he wears. He comes to it by a contract usually recognized in law. If either he or his employer is dissatisfied, the contract may be terminated and the worker is free to seek employment elsewhere. However, with social growth and our changed views of industrial rights and obligations, the strike has become a recognized and accepted method wherewith to force from the employer what could not be secured by conference or simple request. It is to be noted that before labor organized, the employer generally had the advantage in the bargaining, because both he and his employee knew there were others outside the gates ready to do the work, and often for less money.

At this point, it is to be remembered that corporations are as much "organized capital" as labor groups are "organized labor." The president or employing agent of most corporations does not own the business. He merely represents those who hold claim to that title through their shares of stock. In tens of thousands of cases, those who are legal part-owners know nothing at all about the workings in which their money is invested. Thus, the person acting as an employer has a great advantage over the unorganized worker who represents only himself. Clearly, then, the right of labor to organize is axiomatic.

Because my major emphasis here is on "striking," as such, I shall call attention to the present misunderstanding readily created in the minds of returning military men. While most of them come from the ranks and might be supposed to have a natural sympathy for their kind, actually most of them resent strikes now as they did during active wartime. They call our attention to the fact that as long as they were in uniform they were not permitted to strike and their conditions were usually more severe than those imposed on men in industry. They also remind us of shortage of materials from strike-affected plants. This redounds *now*—to the benefit of the employer, who may or may not be right in his argument with the strikers.

We are in constant need of improving our social convictions and putting them into practice by means of social machinery. The strike as a means of expressing dissatisfaction was once a considerable advance over always losing in an argument with the employer. By this time we should be in a position to introduce more modern procedures. There is nothing pleasant about a strike, especially one such as I witnessed recently, and about which I shall comment later. Let me then suggest what seems to me to be a better way of dealing with dissatisfaction in employment:

1. Organized labor should be incorporated.
2. It should have a higher type of leadership.
3. Industrial courts should be set up by Federal law.

Let me explain these three points. If labor were incorporated as well as organized, it would then be subject to the scrutiny of the Corporation Commissions as is the case with incorporated capital. While it is true, in the case of labor, that we are dealing with human beings who cannot by any means be classed with any amount of money, since the members of the labor organizations pay dues and their officers control funds and enact what practically amounts to legislation their financial affairs should be open to the same inspection as any other corporation.

As to the wisdom of organized labor's securing a higher type of leadership, the reason for this suggestion is obvious. A labor leader must do business with the employing agent. He should be the equal of the employing agent. If by dint of intelligence and industry he rises from the ranks, so much the better, for many an employer started at the bottom. What is important is that his integrity, intelligence, deportment, and information shall at once command respect in the finest sense. Obviously, all employers do not meet the highest requirements either. A number of years ago I was called upon to serve with others as an arbitrator in a strike. When we gathered about the table, there were present the employer and his attorney, the labor leader and his attorney, and the several arbitrators. Within a few minutes, it became apparent that we would have great difficulty in bringing the opposing forces to a mutual understanding. The labor leader was rough, uncouth, and foul in his language. Within half an hour, we discovered that the man was what is commonly known as "a walking delegate," who had been sent in from a distant place in order to foment trouble. The following week another case arose where the labor

leader was a man of dignity and refinement and of equal intellectual standing with the employer. They met without handicaps. Each man was aware that he was so close to the woods he could not see the trees, and as a consequence asked the arbitrators to review the situation objectively and impersonally. The result was mutual understanding, respect, and a common agreement in which labor won all its points.

Perhaps the most delicate of the suggestions has to do with the establishment of industrial courts set up by law. I am not recommending the present type of judges in our civil and criminal courts: men who are frequently expected to adjudicate on many and varied matters, even though they secured their positions through political preference. Rather, I have in mind a court composed of sociologists, psychologists, leaders of industry, and leaders of labor, with a court counsel to advise on purely legal matters. There would, of course, be lower and higher courts to which to appeal, and their verdicts would rank with our present courts in enforcement authority. As a last resort, of course, the Supreme Court of the United States would be the final authority, and it, too, should include other professions besides the legal. A time limit should be set for the rendering of verdicts.

Under such a plan, instead of a strike, complaining workers unable to adjust their differences could file suit in the industrial court, which would be empowered to render a verdict, retroactive to the date of formal filing. This industrial court would be equally available to employers.

Were some such procedure as recommended actually in practice, the scenes some of us witnessed in the motion picture strike could not have occurred. It would have been unnecessary for the complaining groups to make an appeal to the National Labor Relations Board whose verdict was withheld entirely too long. Moreover, the court injunction incident, denying the use of more than eighteen pickets would never have taken place. At the moment, it would appear that to get whatever *they* want, employers merely have to find a judge susceptible to the injunction idea. Under the present circumstances, I, myself, witnessed a most deplorable scene. Happily, everything was conducted without bloodshed, but it was not a mark of democratic civilization for dozens of sheriff's deputies to be carrying billy clubs, tear gas bombs, and at least three submachine guns, actually at rigid attention, aimed at the strikers and ready to fire. Fortunately, labor's leadership in this instance had the good sense to counsel the pickets to offer no resistance to the officers, who, upon instruction from their superior, ordered the arrest of the entire picket line, which was taken inside the studio gates, presumably to make the place a temporary jail. Personally, I am not in a position to discuss the merits of this particular strike, which was said to be "jurisdictional" and not directly related to hours, wages, or conditions of labor.

In a time like this, when we are beginning the exceedingly important work of reconstruction, including a just and lasting peace throughout the world, it is necessary that we be calm, judicious, and open-minded. Let us not take sides in industrial disputes *until* we understand all sides of the case. No matter whether we are of the employing or employed group, or the disinterested citizen, we have a great social responsibility to discharge. Passion is never a good judge as to the merits of an argument. Let us remember the old adage, "Whom the Gods would destroy, they first make mad." If we will, above all things, preserve an open mind while these great social issues are thrashed out, it is my judgment that we can demonstrate the validity of the democratic way of life.

The Racial Policy of the Soviet Union

HOMER A. JACK

The racial policy of the Soviet Union is excellent, as even Russia's severest critics must admit. William Henry Chamberlin has written in *The Russian Enigma:* "The nationality policy of the Soviet regime . . . is enlightened and civilized. It could be a promising model for future federations among the peoples of central and eastern Europe. . ." Yet though the racial policy of the Soviet Union is excellent, it is not perfect. Even Russia's greatest friends admit that. Albert Rhys Williams has written in *The Russians:*

> Of course, all the devils of nationalism, of racial pride and chauvinism, have not been extirpated. Prejudices between races trained for centuries to look upon each other with rancor and envy are not melted down in a day or decade. Some Armenians still carry bitter memories of bloody massacres at the hands of Kurds and Turks—and vice versa. Some Moslems and Jews whose culture is bound up with a theocratic or feudal past find it difficult to adjust themselves to the new. While anti-Semitism and any expression of racial or religious contempt are crimes, occasionally before the war one heard the old epithets. Once suppressed and humiliated peoples were sometimes infected by the same spirit they resented in the Russians and were not averse to lording it over minorities within their own borders. But these attitudes were fast disappearing even before the war.

Before discussing the racial policy of the Soviet Union, we should note Russia's problem. And it is—or was—the problem of somehow finding a method by which almost 200 million people, comprising 189 races and peoples of almost every color and shade, can live amicably in a region comprising almost one-sixth of the land surface of the earth. There are the White Russians, the Ukrainians or Little Russians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Kabardins, the Abkhasians, the Circassians, the Khevsurs, the Svans, the Azerbaijanians, the Negroes, the Turco-Tatars, the Uzbeks, the Kazakhs, the three million Jews, the Kurghiz, the Bashkirs, the Finno-Urgians, the Mongols, the Buriats, and the Ajarians.

In fact, in the Abkhdazian Republic of the Caucasians, there is a Negro soviet. Sydney and Beatrice Webb, in their comprehensive study of *Soviet Communism,* describe it:

> The existence of a Negro village, with a soviet of its own race, is, we imagine, unique in Europe. Persons of African descent, though relatively few in number in the USSR, are more than is usually supposed. Besides the scattered workmen in many occupations who have drifted in from the United States, and a small number of highly educated Negro specialists who have been engaged to assist in cotton-growing, etc., there are, about the shores of the Black Sea, quite a number of descendants of the African slaves whom the wealthy used to buy in the slave market of Constantinople. It will be remembered that Pushkin, the first great Russian poet, was of Negro descent.

These 189 peoples constitute the raw materials out of which Soviet Russia has made her policy. What is this policy? Again let the Webbs—a non-partisan source—explain it:

> All sections of the community—apart from those legally deprived of citizenship on grounds unconnected with either race or nationality—enjoy, through the USSR, according to law, equal rights and duties, equal privileges and equal opportunities. Nor is this merely a formal equality under the law and the federal constitution. Nowhere in the world do habit and custom and public opinion approach nearer to a like equality in fact. Over the whole area between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea, and the Central Asian mountains, containing vastly different races and nationalities, men and women, irrespective of conformation of skull or pigmentation of skin, even including the occasional African Negro admitted from the United States, may associate freely with whom they please; travel in the same public vehicles and frequent the same restaurants and hotels; sit next to each other in the same colleges and places of amusement; marry wherever there is mutual liking; engage on equal terms in any craft or profession for which they are qualified; join the same churches or other societies; pay the same taxes and be elected or appointed to any office or position without exception. Above all, these men and women of the USSR, to whatever race or nationality they belong, can and do participate—it is even said that the smaller nationalities do so in more than their due proportion—in the highest offices of government and in the organized vocation of leadership. . . . The Bolsheviks have thus some justification for their challenging question: Of what other area containing an analogous diversity of races and nationalities can a similar assertion be made?

As excellent as the racial policy of the Soviet Union is, equally commendable is the speed with which Soviet Russia has been able to attain the position as undisputed leader of the nations in her treatment of racial, religious, and ethnic minorities. History records that several decades ago Russia was among the most bigoted countries in the world. Russia was the home of the pogrom—the mass lynching of the Jew. Russia was the home of active animosity toward other minority peoples. Then came the revolution and in two decades almost a magical reversal of position. The change has been so swift, so breathtaking that one no longer dares ask: Does human nature change? But now one asks with great curiosity: How does one make human nature change almost overnight in this very difficult field of prejudice and discrimination?

From my study of the racial policy of the Soviet Union and a short visit there in 1937, I would suggest three reasons for the lack of racism in Russia: (1) a non-competitive economic system of full production, (2) a national policy against prejudice, and (3) legislation against discrimination. These three points can be adapted to contribute to the solution of our racial problem here in America.

First of all, Russia has an excellent racial policy because, in peace as in war, she has an economy of full production. Russia has no scarcity economy, but a cooperative economy with jobs for all. And with a cooperative economy, there is no need for management or for society as a whole to pit—for sheer survival—black against white, gentile against Jew, European against Oriental.

One must be an expert economist to understand the details of Russia's economy. But without being an expert, I think we can point out a distinct implication here for America if she is to treat with justice her minorities—and that is that she must give up forever her competitive economy. We must maintain and indeed increase our present high level of national income; we must provide 60,000,000 jobs; and we must even look to Russia to realize that a good number of these jobs will only come by increased public ownership and by increased cooperative developments. Full employment is the best insurance to prevent majorities from using minorities as economic scapegoats and playing one racial or religious minority against the other. And so the maintenance of full production through a cooperative economy is lesson number one from Russia, and more important for the minorities of our country than any single so-called "race" item.

Secondly, Russia has an excellent racial policy because she has a national policy against prejudice toward minority peoples. The revolution with one bold stroke wiped out the suppression of nationality, racial, and religious groups—the arrogant policy of so-called Russification. William Henry Chamberlin shows:

> From a very early period of its existence, the Soviet Government proclaimed a complete reversal of the Tsarist policy of compulsory Russification. A Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, signed by Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and by Stalin as Commissar for Nationalities, and published November 15 (new style) 1917, eight days after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd, lays down the following four basic principles of Soviet Policy in regard to the nationalities of Russia: 1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; 2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, including separation and the organization of an independent state; 3. Abolition of all national and national-religious privileges and limitations; 4. Free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.

This policy was reflected in the Soviet Constitution of 1924 which somewhat rhetorically indicates:

> There—in the camp of Capitalism—reign national enmity, inequality, colonial slavery, chauvinism, national oppression, pogroms, imperialist brutalities, and wars. Here—in the camp of Socialism—prevail mutual confidence and concord, national freedom and equality, a dwelling together of the peoples in peace and their brotherly collaboration.

Even Albert Rhys Williams admits this is "a rather exultant and sweeping assertion. Like all generalization, it has its exceptions." Though exceptions, the rule is there, too, and it is a rule of bringing out the contributions of each people. As Ruth Benedict in *The Races of Mankind* indicates: "The Russians have welcomed cultural *differences* and they have refused to treat them as *inferiorities*." In a sense the cultural patterns of a continent changed overnight. And these changed because the government wanted them to change and was willing to do everything within its power to make for this change. I am not emphasizing the ways the Government tried to build up a sense of brotherhood toward all peoples. Williams tells how the Soviets proceeded against bigots:

> . . . by exposure in the press of all manifestations of national contempt and jingoism, and by holding them up to merciless scorn and ridicule. . . . Social intercourse, intermarriage, and intermingling of the blood streams are now taking place on a tremendous scale between peoples who formerly regarded one another as "aliens," "infidels." . . . Radio and press are battering away at the old taboos and discriminations. Railways and airways are weaving stronger the strands of good will and understanding. In a thousand ways the processes of mutual adaptation and assimilation are accelerated.

Part of this national policy was an educational one. As the Webbs again observe:

> . . . Just because it is not a national state, belonging to a superior race, the Soviet Union has set itself diligently, not merely to treat the "lesser breeds within the law" with equality, but, recognizing that their backwardness was due to centuries of poverty, repression, and enslavement, has made it a leading feature of its policy to spend

out of common funds considerably more per head on its backward races than on the superior ones, in education and social improvements, in industrial investments and agricultural reforms. The record of the USSR in this respect during the past eighteen years stands in marked contrast with the action toward their respective lower races of the governments of Holland or France, and even of that of the United Kingdom, which has been responsible for the government of India, and many of the West Indian Islands, and much of Africa, for more than a century.

Sydney and Beatrice Webb also devote an important section to a discussion of what is not done in Russia. They indicate:

A significant feature of communist ethics is that its prohibitions are practically never independent, but relate essentially to failures to comply with its positive injunctions. . . . Communist morality is avowedly distinct from the law of the land. Ethics . . . is a sum of traditions and customs accepted in a given society, the fulfillment of which is obligatory without any prosecution at law, or any punitive sanction. . . . There is, in fact, in the USSR, no hard and fast line between actions which are simply "not done," and are discouraged by public opinion, and those which, if brought into court, may be punished by judicial sentence. The Comradely Courts of the factories and offices and apartments . . . have no legal jurisdiction, although their reprimands are often accompanied by fines which are invariably paid.

The implication can obviously be drawn for a policy for our own country. Americans must take this business of minority tensions seriously. Nineteenth century laissez-faire will not solve our twentieth-century minority problems any more than it will solve our twentieth century economic problems. It goes without saying that in the United States we cannot quite use the Russian formula of cultural autonomy. There was a time, in America, when perhaps we could have had a forty-ninth state for Negroes, a fiftieth state for Mexican-Americans, and a fifty-first state for Japanese-Americans. But today we are too mixed up—even if we wanted to do this. As Carey McWilliams said recently, the war has accelerated this jumble and migration of American peoples. So we do not want the Russian policy of the autonomy of minorities, although we very much do want a national policy which will welcome differences, refuse to treat them as inferiorities, and, most important, consciously work on American prejudices and stereotypes through all kinds of voluntary societies—the school system, the church, the labor movement, political parties, mayor's committees, and citizens' councils. And to do this effectively we need a national policy, a national will.

Lastly, Russia has an excellent racial policy because she has enacted laws against discrimination. Article 123 of the present Soviet constitution, adopted in 1936, indicates:

Equality of rights of citizens of the USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is the law. Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

But even before this article was adopted, there were severe laws against discriminations. Here is a well-known case which received attention in 1930:

Two white American workers took exception to the presence of an American Negro in a special dining hall for foreign technicians in Stalingrad. In expressing their antipathy they first insulted and then assaulted the Negro. The case was at once taken up by the Soviet authorities and was reported by Pravda (August 28, 1930), as follows: "Upon securing proof that Lewis and Brown had attacked Robinson because of race hatred, the court first recommended that the two offenders be deprived of their freedom for two years. However, after taking into consideration the fact that they had been inoculated with race hatred by the capitalistic system of exploiting the lower races, the court softened the sentence to deportation and exclusion from the Soviet Union for a period of ten years."

Williams also indicates that the Soviets proceeded against bigots by "haling offenders into the courts, inflicting on them drastic penalties, even capital punishment, for the stirring up of racial or religious strife."

This experience of the Soviets, of legislating against discrimination, of using laws—well-prepared and well-administered—calls the lie to those people who say that laws cannot change hearts. Even the professors have said that laws cannot change the habits of a nation. Ever since William Graham Sumner's view that the law represents "a sort of crystallization of the mores," social scientists have said that stateways cannot change folkways. Ellsworth Faris, the famous sociologist, said that racial prejudice is "a matter of the mores and not of the laws." Ruth Benedict, co-author of *The Races of Mankind,* is quoted elsewhere as saying that "legislation is piffling as a functional measure to end racial prejudice." Carey McWilliams, in a paper on "Race Discrimination and the Law" which appeared in the Winter, 1945, issue of *Science and Society,* magnificently shows that discriminations can be reduced by laws, as—in the South—discriminations are enforced and intensified by laws. Indeed, that much-quoted authority, Gunnar Myrdal in *An American Dilemma* says the same thing:

When the foolish attempts to suppress symptoms of ills while leaving the causes untouched become censored, and when law-making increasingly becomes an important task of scientific social engineering, and when, further, administration becomes independent . . . better laws will be made and they will be better enforced even in America.

The experience of our National Labor Relations Act shows that discrimination against unions can be greatly reduced, if often prejudices on the part of management

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The Field

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have played a strategic part; foremost of these of course is the director of the project, Mabel Katherine Pearse, 4700 Kenwood Avenue, Chicago. Others have given material aid, like the anonymous donor of $500 for shoes.

For a while lack of postal service was an obstacle. The chaos which follows the bombing of cities and mass migration of peoples makes it still impossible to locate individuals and guarantee general delivery in Germany. But there is not the same confusion in regard to the displaced peoples. UNRRA has registered each, so that reaching these people is possible, and, in simple justice, they should be the first to receive supplementary packages from America.

The Children's Crusade, carrying an ever-winding stream of gifts and good will, will extend its functions during the next months. On July 25, American children will celebrate a midsummer Christmas party to raise money for the real Christmas to follow overseas on December 25. The bridge of friendship, this year a wider and stronger one, will for the second time be cemented by the mutual singing of carols on Christmas Eve.

Here is a project to touch the heart of our country. It is one which the boys and girls of America should be helped to continue both for its material good and also for the bond of friendship between nations. Schools and children's organizations in every community welcome the chance to help when they have heard the plan.

—*Emily Taft Douglas,*
Representative-at-Large, Illinois.

cannot as easily be eradicated. And the experience of the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices, although grounded in executive decree instead of specific legislation, shows that racial habits can be changed. And Russia has shown us on a wide scale what can be done in erasing discriminations. And so the third lesson we can adopt from Russia is the necessity of enacting well-prepared laws against discrimination. This means for us a permanent FEPC, a federal civil rights act, and statutes outlawing restrictive covenants and lynching.

What is the Soviet formula? A non-competitive economic system of full production, a national policy against prejudice, and legislation against discrimination. Perhaps the most valuable commodity Soviet Russia could have given America by reverse lend-lease is this formula by which, in a generation, she has so successfully turned a country of pogroms and general race hatred into a land where racial and religious minorities experience relative brotherhood. And the irony is that it took this so-called and self-styled "atheistic" nation to show the Christian world the way.

Needed Educational Reforms

VICTOR S. YARROS

Volumes and articles without number have been written in recent years on and about our educational system. The conservatives have demanded a return to classical and so-called humanistic education; the progressives have been advocating radical changes in line with their dynamic philosophy of life and society. All concede that in the last several decades desirable and by no means slight reforms have been effected in education—for example, more attention to the body of the pupil or student, better courses in civics and economics, closer relations between the school and the factory, mine, and office. Further, teachers are less arbitrary, less dogmatic, less bookish. There is more discussion in the classroom, more study of current topics and journals of opinion.

Now, these changes are commendable and wholesome, whatever our ideas about the deeper educational problems may be. And it is certain that further reforms of the same kind will be effected in the future by well-nigh common consent. Education is shaped and molded by life, and life is not static.

Yet certain necessary and important reforms in education, all the way from the primary school to the college, university, and professional school, need more active sponsorship and greater emphasis. Some of these are overlooked in the livelier controversies in the educational realm. It is my purpose to treat of them here.

Despite recent trends, education is still too fragmentary, scrappy, disjointed, and miscellaneous. Young men and women are still able to graduate without having "taken" adequate courses in political science, in economics, in ethics, and in philosophy. The elective system, which had some merit under thoughtful administration, was so glaringly abused in some colleges that not even now has the process of correction and reconstruction reached the worst vices of the system. A good deal of the chatter about the unwisdom of imposing this or that subject, or course, on students unwilling or unable to absorb them and benefit by them is, as H. G. Wells has contended for years, sheer moonshine. It is not the faculty that imposes subjects—it is life itself, the stage of civilization, or barbarism, we live in, the very structure and nature of the universe.

The average boy or girl cannot select his or her studies intelligently. It is absurd, therefore, to appeal in education to the principle of free choice or intellectual and moral self-determination. It is the business of the mature to guide the young and inexperienced in matters of education and preparation for life and work. Within very narrow limits only is the elective system admissible. Certain minor subjects, though interesting and useful, are certainly not essential to the lay citizen —Egyptology, for example, or Greek, or Hebrew, or Spanish, or Chinese art.

No one should be graduated from any college or professional school who has not studied economics, politics, ethics, history and philosophy. Without philosophy there is no approximation to a synthesis, to a world view, to an enlightened attitude toward individual membership in a community, a nation, an international culture, and any collective security system.

We do not demand enough of our school children or students. We allow them, indeed encourage them, to waste much of their time. France has demonstrated that the young can work harder and give a better account of themselves than our youth has done. The ideal of a sound mind in a sound body is not inconsistent with harder work in school or college. Recreation is necessary, but not commercialized and over-organized recreation. Let students be advised to take exercise—to walk, run, dance, play tennis and ball, swim, ride, drive—but intercollegiate contests should be intellectual, not physical. The enthusiasm of aging alumni for football matches is juvenile and silly. Reform this type of sport altogether. It has no place in the educational scheme of a civilized society.

All teaching must be vitalized and related to the actual problems of today and tomorrow. We can learn something from history, but the profoundest educators, including Professor Whitehead, have warned us not to lean unduly on historical analogies and parallels. Even ancient ideas have to be applied very carefully in the light of contemporary conditions and relationships. We cannot build a new society on the foundations of Plato's Republic. That republic, we are told by some scholars, was a picture of heaven, not of our poor little planet; but there is no geographic heaven, and to improve such republics or constitutional monarchies, or soviet-socialist regimes, as we *have* developed, Plato's picture is of very little use to us. We cannot restore slavery, we do not believe in philosopher-kings, or in banishing poets from our communities, or in abolishing private wives and children for the governing elite. Plato cannot recommend measures for the prevention of mass unemployment, or for maintaining full production, or for extending the democratic principle to industrial, com-

mercial, and financial affairs. He cannot persuade the employers to sign union-shop contracts, or trade unions to clean house and eliminate racketeering and dishonesty. Plato's noblest and most beautiful ideas are simply not relevant to our situation, for opinions diverge as to the bearing of those ideas on our complex and peculiar problems.

Education may be vitalized, and should be vitalized, by establishing closer contacts between the school on the one hand, and, on the other, the factory, the shop, the mine, the office, the trade union, the various local and general governments, and administrative bodies. Students, in addition to lectures and textbooks, should learn how men and women work, fight, vote, get their adult political and other education. An able and sound article in the Summer, 1945, issue of *The American Scholar,* by a professor, urges the establishment and cultivation of such contacts. It suggests that students be encouraged to get jobs in vacation periods, or part-time employment while attending classes, with labor officials, regulatory commissions, ward organizations, chambers of commerce, crime commissions, and the like, and be given credit for the work thus done and the information thus gathered and brought into the classroom. This proposal is thoroughly feasible, and if carried out intelligently, it could not fail to yield very substantial advantages.

Education, no matter how good, must be adjudged a failure if it does not develop an irresistible desire to continue study, reading, and reflection *after* graduation, all through the span of life. Our efforts at adult education are better than no effort at all, but they are woefully insufficient and fragmentary. Thanks to radio, we can now extend and improve our adult education. We can have classes and lectures in all the social sciences and fine arts for all sorts and conditions of men and women. Many lectures or seminar discussions can be broadcast, as opera and symphonic music are broadcast, and millions of pupils thus added to those now reached. The shocking amount of piffle and rubbish supplied by radio should dramatize the question of requiring of radio chains and stations more attention to cultural, esthetic and socially profitable subjects. The air should not be all but monopolized by the commercial purveyors of merchandise and patent medicines. A radio license should be granted on certain reasonable conditions only, and the standards of entertainment and amusement should be gradually raised—at the expense of vulgar jazz, sentimental mush of no literary or dramatic merit, and the like. It hardly needs saying that the offensive abuses of raw blatant commercialism in advertising should be reduced to a tolerable minimum.

Finally, we must give serious thought to the role of the daily and weekly press as "educator." Late tendencies have notoriously degraded and corrupted this press. It is Big Business. It is plutocratic, reactionary and deliberately hostile to labor and to constructive liberalism. Its influence—apart from the editorial pages—is still strong and far-reaching. It suppresses certain kinds of news, thus preventing facts and truth from doing their normal work—removing prejudices, correcting wrong impressions, combating anti-social trends. Many papers slant news and refuse to publish protests against misrepresentations. Many papers manage to attract huge circulations by sensationalism, gossip, comic strips, sport reports, cartoons, exploitation of crimes and scandals, and heavy advertising. Insidiously, in a hundred ways, they *mis*educate the less discriminating readers. An intelligent, honest, moderately progressive newspaper or weekly is a real and valuable educator. Alas, we now have *few* papers or weeklies of this type. What steps can be taken by labor, the liberal and evolutionary radical elements in the country, and the sincere and progressive church groups, toward notable and substantial improvement of the unfortunate press situation? The answer to this vital question must be reserved for another time and occasion.

The Study Table

John Erskine Interprets Jesus

THE HUMAN LIFE OF JESUS. *By John Erskine. New York: William Morrow and Company. 248 pp. $3.00.*

If you are one who thinks first of *Helen of Troy* when the name of John Erskine is mentioned—or of his musical criticism—it may come as a surprise to know that he can write a reverently beautiful biography like the one to be reviewed. He explains in the preface that he has written about the *human* life of Jesus "not because I don't believe in him, but because I do. My subject is not a philosophical idea, but a historical event."

There is an aura of personal tenderness about this book, as if the author were writing not for an audience, but as one records in a diary those thoughts which mean most to the individual heart. The style is simple, very direct, and often deeply moving, as John Erskine interprets with erudition—but a determination not to become entangled in scholarly disputes—the events and the teachings of Jesus.

Because the subject is too large to be discussed in general, I would like instead to point out those special angles of his interpretation which struck me as new and forceful. Often they are at variance with conventional thought which, in turn, may have little basis in history. Take the persistent emphasis upon Jesus' peace-loving disposition. Erskine suggests that perhaps this attitude came to him only with maturity, and points out that the apocryphal stories of his childhood speak often of Jesus' violent disposition:

> He was meek in no lamb-like sense; on the contrary he resented injustice, and his temper was hot. Something explosive persisted in him, however he may have learned to control himself; he was in his essential character when he took a whip to them that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the money-changers.

The author points out repeatedly that Jesus was a clear-eyed realist as well as an idealist. In addition to the fact that he lived out his ideals with courage, foresight, and triumph, the parables show him to have been remarkably shrewd in his analyses of people and motives. As a matter of fact, many parables which are seldom used as subjects for sermons because they are

so difficult to interpret according to conventional conceptions of a meek, other-worldly Jesus, can be explained only by a recognition that in them Jesus was depicting human nature as he found it, not as he wished it might be.

> The little stories which he used to drive home his truths are masterpieces. Are we shocked at the suggestion that Jesus was a great artist, a superb story-teller, a born dramatist? Literature furnishes no close parallel and no rivals to these perfect compositions. They can be explained by no study of previous authors.

Then there is the beautiful point of Jesus' hospitality. I have never found exactly this emphasis before, yet how true it seems! I must quote one of the loveliest paragraphs in the book:

> The sacrament of hospitality, of food-sharing, was so close to the spirit of Jesus that a sequence of incidents might be traced through his life all related to the feasts and dinners, the wedding suppers indoors and the feeding of the hungry out of doors, the celebration over the return of a son, or the entertainment of a great man passing by. Jesus loved hospitality. . . . He thought of life itself as a table spread, where we sit as invited guests with no other obligation but this, to bring with us courtesy and cheerfulness, appreciation and gratitude, wit and noble talk, for the greater delight and happiness of those who are bidden with us. . . . The sharing must be done with love.

These are but a few rewarding insights into the personality of Jesus as John Erskine paints it, but they will serve to illustrate the literary style and the warmth of delineation which combine to make the reading of this book a memorable religious experience.

ELEANOR DARNALL WALLACE.

A Classic Work

THE WAY OF LIFE ACCORDING TO LAOTZU. *An American Version by Witter Bynner. New York: John Day Company. 76 pp. $1.50.*

I first became acquainted with Laotzu in the days when I was studying comparative religion at the Harvard Divinity School. I learned to think of him as one of the profoundest religious teachers of all time—perhaps one of the greatest minds that ever lived. Confucius seems shallow and superficial beside him. But his writings, so scant in volume, were hard to understand. They were difficult reading. There seemed to be beauty there, but it was not clearly apparent. There certainly was wisdom, but how to get at it? Was the original text hopelessly obscure, or were the translations inadequate?

As the years passed, I came to feel that a lot of the trouble lay in the translations. Now, as I turn the pages of this lovely little book by Witter Bynner, I am sure of it.

Mr. Bynner, of course, is one of our major American poets. His writings through many years are of a high order, and have won a secure place in our literature. In recent years, his studies and translations of Chinese poetry have opened up to us a new world of appreciation. Now, thus admirably equipped, he turns to the ancient sage, and gives us a new translation of his hitherto cryptic writings. The result is almost a miracle. The eighty-one pieces in this volume shine like gems cut clear and beautiful in every facet. There is not a single obscure line, or unlovely passage. This translation, like Fitzgerald's translation of Omar Khayyam, will stand as the perfect rendering of a classic work.

Witter Bynner's introduction is itself a little masterpiece of interpretation. The publisher has outdone himself in the design and preparation of the book. What a joy this volume is!

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES.

Books Received

THE ALEPH-BET STORY BOOK. *By Deborah Pessin. Published by The Jewish Publication Society of America, 225 S. 15th Street, Philadelphia 2, Penna. 176 pp. $1.50.*

CALVINISM. *By Arthur Dakin. Published by The Westminster Press, Witherspoon Bldg., Philadelphia 7, Penna. 228 pp. $2.75.*

COLLECTED PAPERS OF EVELYN UNDERHILL. *Edited by Lucy Menzies. Published by Longmans, Green & Co., 55 Fifth Avenue, New York City. 240 pp. $2.75.*

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF BAYARD TAYLOR AND PAUL HAMILTON HAYNE. *Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Charles Duffy. Published by the Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, La. 111 pp. $2.00.*

QUATRAINS. *By Albert Ralph Korn. Published by the Comet Press, 200 Varick Street, New York City 14. 63 pp. $1.00.*

ETHICAL IMPERATIVES. *By David Saville Muzzey. Published by the American Ethical Union, 2 W. 64th Street, New York City 23. 63 pp. 25 cents.*

Correspondence

World Language

TO UNITY:

The atomic bomb means that we must learn to live in peace. One important step to peace is the adoption of an interlanguage.

The attached petition, issued by the Internacia Esperanto-Ligo of Heronsgate, Rickmansworth, (Herts) Anglujo, is the first so far as I know to be circulated in every country of the world. I am undertaking to get 1,000 signers myself here in Madison, Wisconsin.

If literature is needed for distribution, send for free copies and prices.

I believe that this is the most important job the Esperantists have undertaken in some time and am trusting to have your full cooperation.

Tre Sincere,
GLENN P. TURNER.

Madison, Wisconsin.

[Readers of UNITY who desire to do so should sign the following form and return it at once to The Esperanto Foundation, P. O. Box 1, Madison 1, Wisconsin.—*Ed.*]

I believe that the international language question is an important and practical one to which the United Nations organization should give urgent and serious consideration.

I believe that a world auxiliary language, serving to supplement the national languages but not to supplant them, is necessary to facilitate communication between the peoples of the world and to promote social progress.

In view of the worldwide use of Esperanto, the only auxiliary language which has had appreciable success, I hope that the United Nations organization will help to spread the use of this language in every possible way; for example, by encouraging its teaching in schools where teachers are available, and developing its use in travel, international commerce and correspondence.

Name .....

Rank or Occupation.....

Address .....

Town .....U. S. A.
Zone State

Date .....Signature .....

Western Conference News

RANDALL S. HILTON, Executive Secretary
700 Oakwood Boulevard, Chicago 15, Illinois

HONOR ROLL

As of April 29th the following churches were reported over the top on the United Unitarian Appeal:

Alton, Illinois.
Angora, Minnesota.
Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Colorado Springs, Colorado.
Davenport, Iowa.
Des Moines, Iowa.
Evanston, Illinois.
Geneva, Illinois.
Grosse Pointe, Michigan.
Hanska, Minnesota.
Hinsdale, Illinois.
Hobart, Indiana.
Humboldt, Iowa.
Jackson, Michigan.
Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Keokuk, Iowa.
Lincoln, Nebraska.
Louisville, Kentucky.
Moline, Illinois.
Omaha, Nebraska.
Rockford, Illinois.
St. Louis, Missouri.
Shelbyville, Illinois.
Underwood, Minnesota.
Urbana, Illinois.
Willmar, Minnesota.

In the next issue I will complete the roll, as there are others known to have exceeded their quota but the money had not been paid in as of the above date.

DINNERS A SUCCESS

Two dinners were held in the Western Conference at which the speakers were Dr. Charles Joy, Miss Elizabeth Green, and Rev. Stephen H. Fritchman. At the Detroit dinner, held at the Statler Hotel, $1,823 was raised for the United Appeal and the Service Committee. At the Chicago dinner $2,046 was contributed. Other meetings were held at Indianapolis and Omaha. Miss Green and Mr. Fritchman also spoke at meetings in Madison, Wisconsin, and Rockford, Illinois.

ROCKFORD INSTALLATION

On Wednesday night, April 24th, Rev. Jack Mendelsohn, Jr., was installed as minister of the Unitarian Church of the Christian Union of Rockford, Illinois. Rev. Kenneth L. Patton, minister at Madison, Wisconsin, preached the sermon. The installation prayer was given by Rev. Randall S. Hilton, Secretary of the Western Unitarian Conference. Greetings from the American Unitarian Association and the Western Unitarian Conference were extended by Dr. Curtis W. Reese, Vice-President of the American Unitarian Association and President of the Western Unitarian Conference. Other participants were Rev. Robert S. Hoagland, of People's Liberal Church, Chicago, who gave the charge to the minister; Dr. Charles P. Connolly, minister emeritus of Rockford, Illinois, who gave the charge to the congregation. Rabbi Leo Bergman offered the invocation. Mr. Paul Caskey, President of the Board of Trustees, conducted the act of installation. Following the service a public reception was tendered Mr. and Mrs. Mendelsohn.

The Rockford church reports that it has taken in fourteen new members in the past six weeks.

SIOUX CITY

Rev. Arthur Graham has gone to Sioux City as interim minister. Mr. Graham was a captain in the army chaplain corps from January, 1941, to December, 1945.

Dr. Ray B. Gilmour is the Chairman of the Board. He and Mr. Graham have reported that the church will entertain the Iowa Association at its annual meeting next October.

KANSAS CITY

The Kansas City church reports that for the fourteen weeks prior to Easter they had an average attendance of over two hundred. The church has put on successful drives for the United Appeal and for a special building fund.

MR. HILTON'S SCHEDULE

March 24—Forum, First Church, Chicago.
March 31—Community Night, Delavan, Illinois.
April 3—Sioux City, Iowa.
April 11—Joy Dinner, Chicago.
April 14—Channing Club, First Church, Chicago.
April 15—People's Liberal Church, Chicago.
April 19-20—Alton, Illinois, and St. Louis, Missouri.
April 24—Rockford, Illinois.
April 28—Beverly Church, Chicago.
April 29-30—Des Moines, Iowa.

PEOPLE'S CHURCH, CHICAGO

Dr. Frederick May Eliot spoke at a mass meeting in the People's Church, Sunday night, April 28th. A special drive for canned foods and money was conducted.

Dr. Bradley, minister of the People's Church, which is the largest Unitarian church in America, reported that there were over eight hundred people who attended the four services conducted on Easter.

FLINT, MICHIGAN

Rev. Leon Rosser Land is now the interim minister at Flint, Michigan. During the war Mr. Land was on the staff of the U.S.O. Between the time of separation from the U.S.O. and his going to Flint he was supply preacher at Newburgh, New York.

EDWIN H. WILSON

Rev. Edwin H. Wilson, formerly minister of the Third Church in Chicago and for the past five years minister of our Unitarian Church in Schenectady, New York, has accepted the call to become minister of the First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City, Utah.

WESTERN CONFERENCE

Annual Meeting—May 31 to June 2—Denver, Colorado.
Summer Assembly—August 18 to 25—College Camp, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin